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COMMENT
STANDING OF STATE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS TO
CHALLENGE STATE AGENCY RULINGS UNDER THE
COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of Colorado's Administrative Procedure Act'
(APA) to provide a uniform system of rulemaking and licensing
procedures for designated state agencies. With respect to judicial
review of rules promulgated thereunder the statute provides:
In order to assure a plain, simple, and prompt judicial remedy to
persons or parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions,
the provisions of this section shall be applicable.'
Since it appears that the statute provides a remedy to any person
or party adversely affected by an agency decision, one might as-
sume that there is a broad scope of judicial review. Before such a
conclusion may be reached, however, it is necessary to examine
the definitions of "person" and "party" in the APA. It is only
from the organic definitions of these terms, and subsequent judi-
cial interpretation which either expands or confines them, that
the scope of review provided can be determined. Two recent Colo-
rado Supreme Court cases, in which boards of county commis-
sioners were denied standing to challenge decisions of state agen-
cies, are illustrative of the manner in which a seemingly broad
statutory mandate may be limited by the courts.
In both cases, Board of County Commissioners [of Dolores
County] v. Love3 and Board of County Commissioners [of Otero
County] v. State Board of Social Services,4 the issue to be re-
solved was whether a county has standing to seek judicial review
of an agency decision which directly affects it. Since there are no
political subdivisions of the federal government with a status
equivalent to that which a county occupies in relation to its par-
ent state, the federal APA and decisions interpreting it are not
relevant to an analysis of the issue by the Colorado court. Other
CoO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-4-101 to -107 (1973) (hereinafter cited as APA).
Id. § 24-4-106(1).
172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970).
528 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1974).
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state courts have faced the issue,5 and, although those courts
applied persuasive rationales, none of the cases involved statu-
tory provisions for judicial review identical to those of the Colo-
rado APA. Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court was relatively un-
assisted by precedent. Nevertheless, given Colorado's statute and
the definitions contained therein, neither decision is logically
supportable. In attempting to reach a result which it may have
considered the lesser of evils, the court, in contrast to its usual
approach to statutory construction' circumvented the plain
meaning of the statute and weakened the definitions of "person"
and "party." The confusion created by these decisions will neces-
sarily be inherited by subsequent cases brought under the APA.
A careful analysis of the relevant APA provisions will illuminate
the issues faced by the court and provide a basis for examining
the alternatives available to it.
I. WHAT IS A "PERSON OR PARTY"?
Judicial review of agency action is granted by the APA to all
aggrieved "persons or parties."' Therefore, in order for a county
to have standing to challenge an agency action, it must be in-
cluded within one of those terms. The statute defines "person"
as "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, and pub-
lic or private organization of any character other than an
agency. "I Although the judicial review section had been ex-
panded in the 1969 revisions to include "parties," the court in
Dolores County relied on the 1963 provisions which granted judi-
cial review only to aggrieved persons.' The effective date of the
amendment was July 1, 1969, and Dolores County was not argued
Cooper Township v. State Tax Comm'n, 393 Mich. 58, 222 N.W.2d 900 (1974); In
re St. Joseph Lead Co., 352 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962).
1 "JA] statute that is clear and unambiguous is not subject to interpretation. Such
an act is held to mean what it clearly says." McMillin v. State, 158 Colo. 183, 187, 405
P.2d 672, 674 (1965), citing Andrews v. Lou, 139 Colo. 536, 541, 341 P.2d 475, 478 (1959),
Montrose v. Niles, 124 Colo. 535, 542, 238 P.2d 875, 878 (1954), Isaak v. Perry, 118 Colo.
93, 95, 193 P.2d 269, 270 (1948), and People v. Mooney, 87 Colo. 567, 571, 290 P. 271, 272
(1930). See also Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973),
citing Lidke v. Industrial Comm'n, 159 Colo. 580, 583, 413 P.2d 200, 202 (1966), and Jones
v. Board of Adjustment, 119 Colo. 420, 428, 204 P.2d 560, 564 (1949); Clayton v. People,
53 Colo. 124, 127, 123 P. 662, 664 (1912).
7 APA § 24-4-106(1).
Id. § 24-4-102(11) (emphasis added).
1 172 Colo. at 126, 470 P.2d at 863, citing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-5 (1963). The
court failed to cite ch. 33, § 6, [19691 Colo. Sess, Laws 89, which amends section 3-16-5.
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until January 12, 1970. Thus, the amendment had been pub-
lished, but, perhaps through oversight, was not presented to the
court."'
What should have been available in Dolores County, and was
subsequently argued in Otero County, is the alternative basis for
standing as an aggrieved "party." "Party" is defined as includ-
ing:
[Alny person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly
seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any
court or agency proceeding subject to the provisions of this article."
If a "person" is anything but an "agency," and if "party"
includes "agencies," it is apparent that the definition of "agency"
is critical to the statute's interpretation. Part of the confusion in
these cases may have arisen because there are two sections of the
APA which are relevant to that term. "Agency" is first defined
as:
[Any board, bureau, commission, department, institution, divi-
sion, section, or officer of the state, except those in the legislative
or judicial branches and except state educational institutions
12
The jurisdiction of the APA is further qualified by a section added
in 1969:
This article applies to every agency of the state having statewide
territorial jurisdiction except those in the legislative or judicial
branches, courts-martial, military commissions, and arbitration and
mediation functions. It applies to every other agency to which it is
made to apply by specific statutory reference; but, where there is a
conflict between this article and a specific statutory provision relat-
ing to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision shall con-
trol as to such agency. 3
Thus, the definitional section explains what an "agency" is, while
the jurisdictional section specifies to which "agencies" the APA
will apply. 4
" The Clerk of the Colorado Supreme Court has no record of briefs filed for either
the plaintiff or defendant. However, Mr. Guy B. Dyer, Jr., counsel for plaintiff, confirmed
by interview on March 22, 1976, that, although he was aware of the amendments, he did
not argue them before the court.
APA § 24-4-102(11) (emphasis added).
12 Id. § 24-4-102(3).
Id. § 24-4-107.
" Interview with Hubert D. Henry, Colorado Legislative Draftsman, July 16, 1975.
1976
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As with the addition of the term "party" in the amendment
to section 106, the jurisdictional provision was not argued in
Dolores County. Relying solely on the definition of "agency," the
court concluded that plaintiff Dolores County was an "agency"
and, therefore, not a "person" who had standing to sue.1" The
court's determination that a county is an "agency," if logically
extended, would require counties to follow other APA provisions
in regard to rulemaking and licensing procedures. There can be
no doubt that political subdivisions of the state are unable to bear
the cost of the administrative procedures mandated by the APA.
It is fortunate that the amendment which limits the application
of APA requirements to agencies of statewide territorial
jurisdiction, thus eliminating counties, was later recognized by
the court in Otero County. Nonetheless, the inclusion of "coun-
ties" in the definition of "agencies" is a questionable interpreta-
tion of the statute which should not have been made if there were
more reasonable alternative interpretations.
II. Dolores County
The dispute in this case arose from an administrative
decision by the Colorado State Board of Equalization and the
Colorado Tax Commission to review appraisals made by the Do-
lores County assessor and to order reappraisals. The county com-
missioners charged that, in making their decision, the agencies
abused their discretion and exceeded their authority. The com-
missioners sought review under alternative theories: First, under
rule 10611 in the nature of mandamus and prohibition against the
defendants, and, second, under the APA as an aggrieved "per-
son."
'" 172 Colo. at 126, 470 P.2d at 863.
" "[TIhe court should not adopt an interpretation, which produces absurd, unrea-
sonable, unjust, or oppressive results, if such interpretation can be avoided." City &
County of Denver v. Holmes, 156 Colo. 586, 590, 400 P.2d 901, 903 (1965), citing Western
Lumber & Pole Co. v. City of Golden, 22 Colo. App. 209, 213, 124 P. 584, 586 (1912). This
philosophy has been codified in CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-203(1)(e) (1973), which states
that:
(1) If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
general assembly, may consider among other matters:
(e) The consequences of a particular construction.
'7 COLO. R. Civ. P. 106.
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A. Rule 106
It was argued by the commissioners that counties are granted
the "capacity to sue and be sued"" and that, therefore, they have
standing to challenge the board of equalization and the tax com-
mission. However, the court reasoned that, since a county is an
arm of the state" and possesses only those powers expressly con-
ferred upon it,2" the power to sue and be sued is limited only to
disputes involving other powers specifically granted to it.
This conclusion presumes that a general power to seek judi-
cial review must be specifically granted by the state to its subdi-
visions. However, in Board of County Commissioners v. Donoho2'
the Arapahoe County commissioners sought a declaratory judg-
ment after the state board of welfare ordered the county to place
Mrs. Donoho on public assistance. The order was challenged by
Donoho and the state board on the grounds that the proper proce-
dure had not been followed-that the county should have filed a
complaint in the nature of certiorari (prohibition) under rule 106.
The court agreed that certiorari would have been more appropri-
ate, but continued to entertain the action. The court assumed
that the county was acting within its authority in seeking judicial
review, without discussing whether it was necessary for the
county to have been expressly granted that power.
It appears that the court in Dolores County was either una-
ware of the Donoho decision or chose not to follow it. In either
case, it may have erred by assuming that the county must be
explicitly granted the power to seek judicial review.
B. Judicial Review Under the APA
More significantly, in Dolores County it was argued that the
county was an aggrieved "person" and, therefore, had the right
to seek judicial review of the reappraisals ordered by the agencies.
After noting that a "person" is anything except an "agency," the
court summarily dismissed the issue, concluding:
Coi.o. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-101()(a) (1973).
Board of County Comm'rs v. City & County of Denver, 150 Colo. 198, 372 P.2d
152 (1962); Colorado Inv. & Realty Co. v. Riverview Drainage Dist., 83 Colo. 468, 266 P.
501 (1928) (dictum).
" Farnik v. Board of County Comm'rs, 139 Colo. 481, 341 P.2d 467 (1959); Robbins
v. Hoover, 50 Colo. 610, 115 P. 526 (1911).
21 144 Colo. 321, 356 P.2d 267 (1960).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
It is clear that a board of county commissioners is an "agency"
within the meaning of the Administrative Code and as such is not a
person who may seek review of "final agency action.
' 2
However, it is not as clear as the court would have us believe that
a board of county commissioners is an "agency." Although a
county is a mere political subdivision of the state, existing only
for convenient administration," it is not necessarily an "agency"
as defined in the APA. Nor is it precluded from being a "person"
in the legal sense. 4
One scholar has stated that "it is generally held that county
and municipal boards are not 'agencies' within the strict meaning
of the [APA] .. ."I It may be noted that the court was
following a very general trend which denies an administrative
officer standing to challenge the decision of a superior board or
tribunal.2 1 However, in other states, courts have developed an
important exception to that rule, and have granted standing in
cases where the challenging party is a political entity which repre-
sents a distinct geographical unit.27 The basis of the exception is
that political subdivisions represent significantly different inter-
ests from the state's when matters of local taxation and adminis-
tration are affected by an agency's decision. Therefore, it was
held to be error for the Michigan State Tax Commission to deny
review to a township that wished to challenge the county board
of commissioners' order increasing the township's assessment.2
Both the township and the county were included in the definition
2 172 Colo. at 126, 470 P.2d at 863.
21 Cases cited note 19 supra.
" Thus, where a statute granted the power of foreclosure to any person holding a lien
on the property, it was held that "[tihe county is a 'person', in the legal sense of the term
.... "County of Lancaster v. Trimble, 34 Neb. 752, 756, 52 N.W. 711, 712 (1892). See
also Calhoun County v. Brandon, 237 Ala. 537, 540, 187 So. 868, 870 (1939); Longview Co.
v. Cowlitz County, 1 Wash. 2d 64, 73-74, 95 P.2d 376, 380 (1939).
23 F. COOPER. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 106 (1965), citing Board of Health v. Sousa,
338 Mass. 547, 156 N.E.2d 52 (1959), Kessler v. Board of Educ., 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D.
1958), Hansen v. Civil Serv. Bd., 147 Cal. App. 2d 732, 305 P.2d 1012 (1957), Stark v.
Heart River Irrigation Dist., 78 N.D. 302, 49 N.W.2d 216 (1951), State ex rel. Wasilewski
v. Board of School Directors, 14 Wis. 2d 243, 111 N.W.2d 198 (1961), and Sloven v. Olsen,
98 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1959).
' See Davis, Standing of a Public Official to Challenge Agency Decisions: A Unique
Problem of State Administrative Law, 16 An. LAW REV. 163 (1964).
" Id. at 173.
21 Cooper Township v. State Tax Comm'n, 393 Mich. 58, 222 N.W.2d 900 (1974).
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of "person" under the Michigan APA.29 With respect to the inter-
ests that each represented, the court noted:
The Township, as the representative for equalization purposes of all
the taxpayers within its boundaries, has a valid and recognizable
interest in assuring that its residents are not taxed at an unfair rate.
Likewise, the County Board of Commissioners, as representatives of
the entire county, have a duty to equalize the assessments through-
out the county so that all taxpayers pay a proportionately fair share
of the cost of government."'
Although the case may be distinguished by noting that the
township sought review from an administrative agency and not
from a court and that the Michigan statute specifically recognizes
that governmental subdivisions are "persons," the court's dis-
cussion of the separate interests which the state and a political
subdivision may represent is nevertheless enlightening. This
theory was also advanced in a Missouri case, In re St. Joseph
Lead Co. ,31 which is factually similar to Dolores County. There
the county sought judicial review of an order requiring reassess-
ment of property within the county. It was granted standing after
the court reasoned that counties levied taxes in accordance with
express constitutional powers and, therefore, had a vital interest
in all questions relating to the levy and assessment of taxes.
Hence, a county was an aggrieved "person" or "party" within the
meaning of the relevant statutes.2
It is apparent from these cases that there is a rationale, albeit
developed in foreign jurisdictions, for granting standing to a
county as an aggrieved "person." However, the Colorado court,
in choosing not to accept the rationale, failed to recognize the
unique interests a county represents. This decision may be due,
in part, to the fact that the court was not presented with the most
recent amendments to the APA, which subject an "agency" to the
" MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.205(4) (Supp. 1975-76): "'Person' means an individ-
ual, partnership, association, corporation, governmental subdivision or public or private
organization of any kind other than the agency engaged in the particular processing of a
rule, declaratory ruling or contested case."
I" Cooper Township v. State Tax Comm'n, 393 Mich.-58, 65, 222 N.W.2d 900, 905-06
(1974).
3' 352 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962).
1' Id. at 661. It should be noted that Missouri's provisions for administrative proce-
dure and review, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 536.010-.140 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1975), do not
contain a definition of either "person" or "party."
1976
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
act's provisions only if it is of "state-wide territorial jurisdiction"
and which grant standing to an aggrieved "party." The court may
also have been concerned with previous decisions which disal-
lowed county interference with decisions by the state board of
equalization,"3 or which stated that the powers of the state in
matters of taxation are not subject to judicial control. 4 However,
those decisions were not brought under the APA provisions for
judicial review, and, therefore, should not have been controlling.
Moreover, such an argument was dismissed by the Missouri Su-
preme Court in In re St. Joseph Lead Co. 5 and could have been
similarly dealt with in Dolores County. It appears that the Colo-
rado court was more concerned with finding a rationale which
would harmonize with related, though non-controlling, precedent
than with carefully analyzing the APA.
The implications of Dolores County are far-reaching for
counties and other units of local government, such as school and
water districts. If applied literally, its effect is that, no matter
how particularized or severe the harm caused by an agency's
action, local governmental units will not be offered the opportu-
nity to seek judicial review of the action. Denying access to the
courts in this regard is tantamount to denying access to all those
persons within the governmental unit who, although not person-
ally aggrieved by the agency decision, are citizens of the political
subdivision and may be harmed indirectly.
One might also speculate as to the nature of decisions made
by state agencies confident that their decisions are beyond chal-
lenge from political subdivisions. A decision such as Dolores
County potentially increases the indirect power of state agencies.
Relief through court action has historically been the most signifi-
cant "check" on the irresponsible exercise of governmental pow-
ers. Absent that "check," state agencies become less accountable
to local governments and their citizens.
III. Otero County
Although the issue presented by Dolores County will proba-
E.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. McIntire, 23 Colo. 137, 46 P. 638 (1896).
E.g., Skidmore v. O'Rourke, 152 Colo. 470, 383 P.2d 473 (1963).
"rTIhe fact that the commission may in certain circumstances be the final arbiter
of valuation [doesi not necessarily mean that .. .a political subdivision, a county, may
or should be denied the right of judicial review."
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bly arise infrequently, the Colorado Supreme Court soon had an
opportunity to reconsider the issue in Otero County.3" The
amendments limiting the application of the APA to agencies of
"state-wide territorial jurisdiction" and granting standing to ag-
grieved "parties" as well as "persons" are discussed in the Otero
County opinion, which indicates that the court had all the rele-
vant statutory provisions before it. Had the court chosen to re-
evaluate its policy of denying standing to political subdivisions,
an excellent opportunity to do so was presented. However, Do-
lores County was held to be controlling in all respects. In order
to reach that result, the court summarily dismissed the amend-
ment giving "parties" the right to seek judicial review, stating
that it added nothing to the statute.
Otero County involved a dispute over a rule promulgated by
the Colorado State Board of Social Services. The rule, "Revised
County Compensation for 1974," provided salary increases for
county public assistance and welfare department employees. The
Board of County Commissioners of Otero County and the Colo-
rado State Association of County Commissioners sued, alleging
that the rule exceeded the state board's jurisdiction and consti-
tuted an abuse of its discretion. The suit was dismissed for want
of standing, and the Otero County commissioners appealed, con-
tending that the APA granted a judicial remedy to "persons" or
"parties" adversely affected or aggrieved.
The court succinctly stated the issue to be "whether a Colo-
rado county, acting through its Board of County Commissioners,
has standing to challenge the rules and regulations promulgated
by the State Board of Social Services."37 After reciting the
provisions authorizing judicial review for either an aggrieved
"person" or "party," the court then endeavored to determine
whether Otero County was an aggrieved "person." Reiterating
the notion that a county is a mere subdivision of the state, the
court held that Dolores County was controlling, and, therefore,
Otero County was an "agency," not a "person."
In response to the argument that the court in Dolores County
had failed to consider the 1969 amendment limiting the applica-
1 528 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1974).
17 Id. at 245.
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bility of the APA to agencies of statewide jurisdiction, the court
concluded that the amendment was not applicable to the
problem. This conclusion seems to imply that the amendment to
section 107 does not qualify the definition of "agency," but in-
stead only specifies which "agencies" are required to comply with
APA procedures. Thus, there are some agencies (those of state-
wide jurisdiction) which will apply APA procedures and other
agencies which do not have to apply APA procedures but are
nevertheless "agencies" within the statutory definition." It is of
little consequence to the court which type of "agency" a county
is. Once held to be an "agency," the county is denied standing
as an aggrieved "person."
Although the court may be correct in its interpretation of
section 107, the difficulty with its analysis is that it avoids the
more basic question first presented in Dolores County: Admitting
that a county is a political subdivision of the state, does that
necessarily mean that it is an "agency"? One can only speculate
as to the reason for the court's avoidance of this issue. Its effect
was to eliminate the county's first argument, leaving only the
alternative ground for standing as an aggrieved "party" in issue.
The definition of "party" includes "persons" and "agencies" who
have been admitted or are entitled to be admitted to the proceed-
ings. " In light of the court's reiteration of its determination that
counties are "agencies," it seems clear that the county should
have had standing as an aggrieved "party" if it had some interest
in the rule which was promulgated. However, the court again
denied standing to the county, this time by dismissing an entire
legislative amendment.
After setting out the definition of "party," the court con-
cludes:
The addition of the term "party" in 1969 does not enhance the
appellant's position or diminish the efficacy of the Court's reasoning
" In a more recent case, Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 543 P.2d 83 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975), it was held that the county was not required to conduct liquor license sus-
pension proceedings pursuant to the APA. Citing both Dolores County and Otero County,
the court reasoned that, although the county was a state agency, it was not one of state-
wide territorial jurisdiction, nor had the general assembly directed counties to apply APA
procedures. Thus, it appears that the courts will follow the rationale that there are two
types of agencies.
31 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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in [Dolores County]. Viewing the term "party" in the context of the
act makes it clear that its addition does not confer rights upon the
Commissioners which did not exist under the original act.4"
Contrary to that conclusion, an amendment which grants stand-
ing to "persons" and "agencies," where the original statute
granted standing only to "persons," must confer additional
rights. There would be little, if any, reason for such an
amendment if the legislature had not intended to allow judicial
review for agencies which were or could have been parties to the
administrative proceedings.4' In addition, the county had in fact
been admitted as a party to the rulemaking proceedings of the
board of social services. The state board had, therefore, implicitly
recognized the unique interests which the county represented,
i.e., that the county would be the administrator of the welfare
program and that county funds would be expended for the salary
increases authorized by the state.
Because the county had participated at the rulemaking hear-
ing, it would seem illogical to deny it standing as an aggrieved
"party" for the purpose of challenging the rule created thereby.
However, the court noted that the statutory provisions only re-
quire that notice of hearings be given to "persons" affected and
that interested "persons" be given the opportunity to submit
views.42 Since counties are not "persons" in the court's analysis,
it concludes that the county had been extended the mere courtesy
of presenting evidence at the rulemaking hearing" but was not,
in fact, a "party." Thus, the anomaly is created that, because the
county was not a "person," it was not a "party" either-even
though it had been an active participant in the rulemaking pro-
528 P.2d at 246.
"In making material changes in the language of a statute, the legislature cannot
be presumed to have regarded such changes as without significance, but must be pre-
sumed to have had a reasonable motive." General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp.
381, 393 (D. Colo. 1956), citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107
(1941). "[An amendment generally instead of implying an intent to reiterate implies an
intent to change the amended law . People v. City & County of Denver, 84 Colo.
576, 579, 272 P. 629, 630 (1928).
2 APA §§ 24-4-103(2), (4), (11) (j).
1' 528 P.2d at 248. In a similar case, Will County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax
Appeal Bd., 48 I1. 513, 272 N.E.2d 32 (1971), it was argued that the county board of review
was not a "party" within the meaning of the APA. The court held that, from the provisions
of the statute which required that the county board be notified of the filing of a petition
for review with the appeal board, it could be implied that the county was a "party."
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
cess. In effect, the court allows the county to function as a
"party" for the purpose of rulemaking, but not for the equally
important purpose of seeking judicial review. This determination
was justified by an extended discussion of the "legislative
scheme" of the Colorado Social Services Code" and the subordi-
nate role played by the county therein. Ultimately, the court
held:
We conclude that the right to judicial review of the final administra-
tive actions of the State Board of Social Services, under the law of
this state, is limited to those parties to the proceeding before the
administrative agency whose rights, privileges, or duties, as distinct
from those of the State, are adversely affected by the decision."
No such language can be found in any of the pertinent stat-
utes. This was, in effect, a major redrafting of the APA provisions
for judicial review. Perhaps the court feared that a different deci-
sion would open the door to additional litigation, or that political
subdivisions should not be able to challenge decisions of the state
government which created them. That theory has been supported
by the argument that, if state administrative decisions are sub-
ject to review brought by affected governmental subdivisions as
well as affected persons, those decisions tend to become mere
recommendations. But, if there are valid reasons for denying
standing to counties, they were not enunciated by the court, and
it remains unclear why careful analysis of the APA was sacrificed.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
The modifications of the terms "person" and "party" result-
ing from the court's analysis in Otero County were unnecessary
in light of the several alternative solutions available. Some would
have had the same effect of denying standing to the county, while
causing less damage to the APA.
If the errors made in Dolores County are attributable to a
failure to argue all of the relevant statutory provisions, it is more
difficult to understand the court's failure to recognize those provi-
sions in Otero County. Had the court overruled Dolores County,
granted standing to Otero County as an aggrieved "person" and
528 P.2d at 247. See Cor.o. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-1-101 to -126 (1973).
528 P.2d at 248.
" Davis, supra note 26, at 182-83.
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"party," and justified this through acknowledgment of the
amendments, such a decision would have restored the APA to its
fullest meaning and would have relieved the confusion as to the
status of political subdivisions under the APA.
Even assuming that the court was determined to reach the
result it did, it could have done so by using one of two alternative
arguments. The court could have distinguished Dolores County
and held that a county is a "person" and a "party," but denied
standing to Otero County on the basis that it was not sufficiently
"affected or aggrieved." Since those terms, unlike "person" and
"party," are not defined by the statute, judicial interpretation of
them would be more appropriate. This solution has been used by
courts in other jurisdictions to deny judicial review,47 and would
have been less damaging to the integrity of the APA.
Additionally, one section of the statute, evidently over-
looked, could have resolved the issue. According to the amended
section dealing with applicability of the APA, the act applies to
agencies of statewide territorial jurisdiction and to
every other agency to which it is made to apply by specific statutory
reference; but, where there is a conflict between this article and a
specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, such spe-
cific statutory provision shall control as to such agency.4"
Since the court in Otero County thoroughly analyzed the subordi-
nate role of the county in the state's comprehensive scheme for
providing social services, the court could have concluded that
there was a "conflict" between the APA and the Colorado Social
Services Code, and, therefore, that the latter should prevail. Al-
though this is an imprecise interpretation of the "conflicts
clause," it is one which has been followed in previous Colorado
decisions, 9 and thus would have done no further harm to the
APA.
17 Board of Educ. v. Town of Islip, 15 App. Div. 2d 789, 224 N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d Dept.
1962); King v. Stark County, 72 N.D. 717, 10 N.W.2d 877 (1943).
" APA § 24-4-107 (emphasis added).
" Comment, The Colorado Administrative Procedure Act-Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
3-16-6; Application-A Matter of Construction, 51 DENVER L.J. 275, 276 (1974). Neither
North Kiowa-Bijou Management Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n, 180 Coo. 313, 505 P.2d
377 (1973), nor Public Util. Comm'n v. District Ct., 180 Colo. 388, 505 P.2d 1300 (1973),
lays out a direct "conflict" between the provisions of the organic statutes and the APA.
From the language of North Kiowa that "the Code has no applicability where a specific
statutory provision relating to a specific agency provides a scheme for the administrative
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Because neither of the suggested alternatives was chosen,
and, therefore, counties and other political subdivisions have
been denied the opportunity to challenge agency decisions, the
remaining remedy is to amend the definition of "person" to in-
clude "political subdivisions." Local governments would thus
automatically have standing if they were sufficiently aggrieved.
Several states explicitly include "political subdivisions" within
their definitions of "person," 50 as does the Revised Model State
Act." Colorado's definition parallels the Model Act except for this
inclusion. The legislators may have assumed this would be super-
fluous, because other sections of the statute would preclude any
finding that political subdivisions are "agencies." Nonetheless,
only an amendment would make that determination unequivocal,
allowing no room for further judicial interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Both Dolores County and Otero County leave much to be
desired in terms of a clear, rational interpretation of the APA.
Even if Dolores County can be attributed to inadvertent error on
the part of counsel, Otero County, in which the amendments were
presented, can not be similarly dismissed. The decision is thus
more suggestive of avoidance of the statutory mandate than of
any serious effort to interpret it.
Whatever reasons the court may have had for these decisions,
they cannot outweigh the gravity of denying standing to counties
which are adversely affected by agency actions. Since it is proba-
ble that no citizen will be sufficiently aggrieved in a personal
capacity, agency decisions will go virtually unchallenged. In addi-
tion, the court's interpretations of "person" and "party" will af-
fect any action brought in the future under the judicial review
provision of the APA. The court's failure to choose any of the
control of the agency," it appears that the court has determined that there is a "conflict"
whenever another statute provides a "comprehensive scheme" of administration. See 180
Colo. at 317, 505 P.2d at 379.
'a IND. CODE § 4-22-1-2 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § (4) (1966); MICH.
COMP. LAWs ANN. § 24.205(4) (Supp. 1974-75); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.1(d) (1962).
: MODEL. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1946): "'[Pierson' means any indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision, or public or pri-
vate organization of any character other than an agency." Id. § 1(6).
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available alternatives is a clear indication that relief from the
effects of these decisions must come from the legislature.
Susan E. Ertle
